What’s my target? Analyst forecast dispersion and earnings management through effective tax rates by Paul Wong et al.
What’s my target? Analyst forecast dispersion and earnings management through effective 
tax rates  
 
ABSTRACT 
Kirk, Reppenhagen, and Tucker (2014) report that, consistent with the existence of private 
information, investors use individual analyst forecasts as additional benchmarks to evaluate 
reported earnings. Following this logic, we investigate whether managers consider the private 
information in a subset of analyst forecasts when managing earnings. Specifically, we test 
whether changes in year-end tax accruals are associated with analyst forecast dispersion, our 
measure of private information. We find that when pre-managed earnings would have beat the 
consensus and analyst private information is low (i.e., dispersion is low), managers increase tax 
expense and create cookie jar reserves. When analyst forecasts reflect increased levels of private 
information (i.e., dispersion is high), we find that firms use tax expense to further increase 
earnings even when pre-managed earnings would have beat the consensus. Additional analyses 
reveal that the effect of dispersion is conditional on the proximity of pre-managed earnings to the 
consensus forecast. Our results highlight how managers consider individual analyst forecasts to 
calibrate earnings management and contribute to our understanding of earnings management 
activity around consensus estimates.  
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What’s My Target? Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Earnings Management through 
Effective Tax Rates  
 
1.  Introduction 
Kirk, Reppenhagen, and Tucker (2014) argue that individual forecasts contain private 
information over the consensus forecast, and they report that meeting individual analyst forecasts 
is associated with incremental explanatory power for the market reaction on earnings news. If 
managers understand how investors react to the perception of private information in analyst's 
forecasts, then managers have an incentive to manage earnings to satisfy those forecasts. In this 
study, we posit that the level of analysts’ private information is reflected in the variation of 
individual forecasts, where high (low) levels of private information are reflected in higher 
(lower) variation in individual forecasts.1 Using analyst forecast dispersion as a measure of 
analysts’ private information and the differing analyst expectations, we investigate whether 
earnings management behavior is related to the dispersion in individual analyst forecasts.  
Prior studies suggest that the consensus analyst forecast is an important benchmark and 
that firms attempt to manage earnings upward to avoid the negative market consequences 
associated with falling short of expectations.2 At the same time, managers face incentives in 
some situations to manage earnings downward to create reserves that can be reversed in future 
periods. For example, when pre-managed earnings exceed a target, managers have an incentive 
to select income-decreasing actions that can be used to increase the expected future rewards 
(Healy 1985). Thus, managers face different motivations for manipulating firm performance 
 
1 Analysts interpret public and private information to develop earnings forecasts (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1990; 
Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens 1998), where public information is share amongst all analysts and is reflected in all 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Thus, the differences in earnings forecasts that results in forecast dispersion is due to 
private information held by some analysts.  
2 See, for example, Matsumoto (2002); Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002); Kasznik and McNichols (2002); Dechow, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2003); Brown and Caylor (2005); Graham, Harvey, Rajgopal (2005); Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997); Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999); Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills (2004); and Burgstahler and Eames 
(2006). 
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when pre-managed earnings are on either side of earnings targets.  
Although the consensus forecast is an important earnings target around which firms 
manage earnings (Brown and Caylor 2005), it is a metric that discounts private information 
within individual analyst forecasts and inefficiently weights analysts’ common information 
relative to private information (Kim et al. 2000). The underweighting of individual analysts’ 
expectations is important because managers face a disincentive to create cookie jar reserves 
when some relevant expectations exceed the consensus. Specifically, when some of the 
individual forecasts exceed the consensus by a greater extent, they represent expectations based 
on private information that could be disappointed even if reported earnings are above the 
consensus. Thus, we posit that managers are less likely to take purposeful actions that decrease 
earnings to create reserves for future periods when forecasts are disperse because the firm is 
more likely to disappoint some investors. In contrast, firms with more precise (less disperse) 
forecasts have a greater opportunity to create reserves because these managers can be more 
confident that the firm will still meet or exceed market expectations even if earnings are reduced 
to some extent.3  
In this study, we exploit the earnings management through tax expense setting in 
Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills (2004), which provides advantages to examine our research 
question. Because analysts continuously revise their earnings forecasts during the year as they 
obtain additional public and private information, we require a setting in which individual 
forecasts have fully incorporated their private information and in which individual forecasts can 
be compared to the consensus. The fourth quarter tax expense accrual provides such a setting 
 
3 See Figure 1, discussed in section 2.2, which illustrates how dispersion makes it more likely that a firm will 
disappoint some analysts despite being above the consensus. Note that differences in analyst forecasts can result 
from differences in information or information processing among analysts.  
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because managers can observe and react to changes in the analyst forecasts by manipulating tax 
expense up to the end of the year.4 Prior research demonstrates that managers use tax accruals as 
a “last chance” to manage earnings prior to preparing the financial statements (Dhaliwal et al. 
2004; Graham et al. 2012). Systematic increases in the ETR from the third to fourth quarter are 
consistent with earnings management to create cookie jar reserves, while systematic decreases in 
ETR from the third to fourth quarter are consistent with upward earnings management (e.g., to 
meet or beat expectations).5 This is a crucial advantage to our research design and not possible 
using other potential indicators of earnings management, such as discretionary accruals, which 
do not require an annual estimate in third quarter.  
In addition, prior research suggests that tax expense requires a significant amount of 
estimation and judgment, and managers update tax expense by negotiating with auditors 
immediately prior to earnings announcements (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Graham et al. 2012). 
Managers consider a number of issues that affect tax expense and require estimation and 
judgement, such as mix of income from multiple jurisdictions, tax credits, uncertain tax 
positions, and valuation allowances.  Thus, these mechanisms provide a significant amount of 
discretion in tax expense reporting that affords managers a last opportunity to manage earnings. 
However, because our purpose is to investigate the overall effects of manager’s perception of 
private information, we leave the determination of the specific mechanism through which 
managers manipulate tax expense to future studies. 
We find that when analysts private information is low (i.e., forecast dispersion is low) 
 
4 We acknowledge that we cannot fully rule out the use of other earnings management techniques, such as real 
earnings management, during the year. However, because we can directly observe tax expense changes in the 4th 
quarter, this setting allows us to focus on year-end earnings management actions and control for the number and 
timing of individual forecast revisions.  
5 We acknowledge that changes from 3rd to 4th quarter can be due to unforeseen changes and estimation errors; 
however, we are interested in systematic signed changes, which indicate manipulation up or down on average.  
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and earnings would have beat analysts’ consensus forecast without a change in ETR (i.e., pre-
managed earnings exceed the target), firms increase their ETR. This result is consistent with 
firms using tax expense to create cookie jar reserves because consistent expectations among 
analysts allows for firms to manage earnings toward a precise benchmark. However, firms 
increase their ETR to a lesser extent as analyst private information and forecast dispersion 
increases. This result is consistent with decreased incentives to create reserves when the earnings 
target is less precise because of the presence of private information and differing expectations. In 
fact, we find evidence that firms with pre-managed earnings greater than the target decrease their 
ETR when forecast dispersion is high. In other words, firms covered by analysts with varying 
expectations increase earnings even though pre-managed earnings already exceed the consensus. 
These results contribute to the earnings management literature by providing a greater 
understanding of earnings management activity around analysts’ forecasts. 
We also examine the change in analyst forecast dispersion from the third to fourth quarter 
to further isolate the association between the precision of the market’s expectations and year-end 
earnings management behavior. We find that decreases in dispersion during fourth quarter are 
positively associated with last-chance earnings management actions to create cookie jars. This 
result suggests that changes in dispersion affect whether firms use tax accruals to manage 
earnings at year-end and also provides a partial explanation for why prior research has not 
provided evidence that firms use tax expense to create cookie jar reserves (Graham et al. 2012). 
Firms have a disincentive to create cookie jar reserves when the earnings target becomes less 
precise. 
In addition to investigating whether dispersion affects the use of tax accruals to manage 
earnings downwards to create reserves, we investigate whether firms decrease tax expense to 
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meet or beat earnings targets based on variation in analyst private information (i.e., pre-managed 
earnings are below the analyst consensus). When pre-managed earnings are below the consensus, 
it is unclear whether managers will react to analyst forecast dispersion. Managers have an 
incentive to manage earnings upward to meet the consensus, especially when forecasts are 
largely based on common information (forecasts are less dispersed). However, the market’s 
earnings expectations are less clear when analysts appear to have private information and 
forecasts are more dispersed. Following Kirk et al. (2014), managers have an incentive to meet 
the consensus expectation and the expectations of those analysts with private information, which 
leads managers to further decrease tax expense to meet the consensus forecast and some 
forecasts above the consensus. If managers act in a manner consistent with this conjecture, we 
expect analyst forecast dispersion will be more likely to increase earnings by decreasing ETRs.  
We find a negative association between ETR changes and the amount by which the firm 
would have missed analysts’ consensus forecast without changes in ETR (i.e., the extent to 
which pre-managed earnings are below the target). This result is consistent with prior research 
(e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2004) and suggests that firms manage their ETR downward in an attempt to 
meet or beat the consensus forecast on average. However, consistent with the conflicting 
incentives discussed above, we find no systematic evidence that the extent of meet or beat 
activity varies with analyst forecast dispersion. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of 
dispersion on earnings management actions is conditional on the proximity to the consensus 
forecast. Specifically, we find a nonlinear effect of dispersion, where dispersion has a reduced 
effect on meet or beat (cookie jar) behavior as pre-managed earnings are further below (above) 
the consensus forecast. We also find that our primary results are stronger for firms that issue 
earnings guidance, consistent with prior research that suggests firms that issue guidance are more 
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concerned about managing earnings around expectations. 
We provide several contributions to the earnings management literature. First, we 
document that earnings management using tax expense is associated with not only incentives to 
beat the earnings consensus, but also by the amount of private information contained in analyst 
forecasts that results in differing targets. Although numerous prior studies suggest that the 
consensus analyst forecast is an important benchmark for managers, the association between the 
dispersion of the earnings target and earnings management actions around the benchmark is not 
well documented in the literature. Second, our study provides evidence that some firms use the 
discretion available in tax expense to create cookie jar reserves and are more likely to do so 
when forecast dispersion is low. This result provides a contribution to the literature because it 
offers a partial explanation regarding the absence of evidence in prior studies that firms use 
discretion in tax expense to create reserves (e.g., Graham et al. 2012).  
Finally, we provide further evidence that the timing with which the earnings target 
becomes more/less certain affects the timing and the type of earnings management used (i.e., 
using tax accounts versus other techniques). Prior research does “not provide evidence on how 
firms choose among earnings management tools” (Dechow et al. 2010, page 385). While prior 
studies show that managers use specific techniques to manage earnings, such as real earnings 
management (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006) or tax expense (Dhaliwal et al. 2004) to manage 
earnings, our study provides evidence regarding the circumstances that affect management’s 
proclivity to use tax expense to manage earnings late in the year.  
2.  Background and hypothesis development 
2.1.  Earnings management around benchmarks 
Prior studies suggest that earnings benchmarks are relevant to managers. Numerous prior 
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studies have documented a “kink” in the distribution of reporting around certain earnings 
benchmarks indicating earnings management activity to meet or beat these earnings targets (see 
Healy and Wahlen 1999; Habib and Hansen 2008; and Dechow et al. 2010, section 3.1.5, for 
reviews of the target beating literature).6 Common benchmarks examined in prior research 
include “zero” earnings (Hayn 1995), earnings changes (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997), and 
analysts’ consensus forecasts (Degeorge et al. 1999; Burgstahler and Eames 2006). Several prior 
studies document the incentives to meet earnings expectations. Firm managers are incentivized 
to meet earnings expectations due to stock price benefits (e.g., DeAngelo et al. 1996; Barth et al. 
1999; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Brown and Caylor 2005; Myers et al. 2007), to reduce the 
cost of debt (Jiang 2008), and to earn greater compensation (Matsunaga and Park 2001). Taken 
together, these studies suggest that firm managers have economic benefits to meet or beat 
earnings benchmarks. 
Prior research also acknowledges that firm managers face incentives to smooth earnings 
or create cookie jar reserves that can be used to increase earnings in future periods. Healy (1985) 
proposes a theory that when pre-managed earnings are above an earnings target, the manager 
will have the incentive to select earnings management actions that decrease earnings in the 
current period, which increases the expected future reward.7 Similarly, Kirschenheiter and 
Melumad (2002) examine a model that suggests managers will smooth earnings when news is 
 
6 The interpretation of the “kink” as evidence of earnings management is not without controversy and is subject to 
alternative explanations. Dechow et al. (2003) find no difference in discretionary accruals for profit and loss firms. 
Beaver et al. (2007) suggest the kink around zero earnings can be explained by asymmetric taxes. Durtschi and 
Easton (2005, 2009) suggest that the kink can be explained by sample bias issues related to scaling earnings by stock 
price. However, as Dechow et al. (2010, p. 365) suggest, the evidence on earnings management around analysts’ 
forecasts is more persuasive.  
7 While Healy (1985) discusses this theory in the context of an earnings target that provides the manager with a 
bonus, the theory applies to analyst forecast targets as well. If pre-managed earnings are above the analyst consensus 
forecast, managers can take action to create cookie jar reserves that can be used to manage earnings upward in future 
periods.  
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“good.” Consistent with these incentives, Graham et al. (2005) report that 78% of the executives 
surveyed indicated they would sacrifice economic value in exchange for smoother, more 
predictable earnings. Overall, prior research acknowledges differing incentives when pre-
managed earnings are on either side of earnings targets.  
2.1.1.  Consensus estimate as a benchmark 
Past evidence suggests that the consensus analyst forecast is the most important earnings 
benchmark (Brown and Caylor 2005). However, recent studies suggest that aggregated estimates, 
such as the mean or median consensus forecast, omit relevant information within individual 
forecasts (Kim et al. 2001). Kirk et al. (2014) find evidence that investors consider earnings 
surprises with respect to individual analyst forecasts in addition to the consensus forecast 
because of the differences in how individual analysts obtain and process information. Kirk et al. 
(2014) report significant positive returns around the earnings announcement date only when the 
firm meets at least 90 percent of forecasts. This evidence suggests that it is likely that managers 
consider factors other than the consensus forecast when determining the most relevant 
benchmark.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests managers are aware of and concerned about individual 
estimates that comprise the consensus forecast. For example, when Group 1 Automotive missed 
its fourth quarter EPS estimate for 2018, CFO John Rickel began his portion of the earnings call 
by explaining: 
“As of 10:30 P.M. Central Standard Time last night, the consensus in Bloomberg and in 
FactSet was basically $2.29 per share. Sometime over the overnight hours, a new 
estimate was entered into the system from our Morgan Stanley analyst, who increased his 
quarterly estimate from $2.25 to $2.58, an almost 15% increase in expected 
earnings…We would respectfully suggest to our covering analysts and to our investors 
that the appropriate thing to do is to ignore that higher estimate that came in late.” 
(Levine 2019) 
This example demonstrates that management was aware of how individual estimates affect 
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expectations and can change the consensus estimate just prior to the earnings announcement. 
Furthermore, each estimate can differ due to individual analyst characteristics such as the 
analyst’s experience, effort, number of firms and industries covered, and the analyst’s brokerage 
size (O’Brien 1988; Brown 1991; Stickel 1992; Mikhail et al. 1997; Jacob et al. 1999; Clement 
1999; Clement and Tse 2003, 2005). Thus, the heterogeneity in analysts’ forecasts reflects 
market’s perception that some analysts have access to private information and could have an 
effect on firms’ accounting decisions to satisfy investors’ expectations.8  
2.1.2.  Earnings management using tax expense 
A body of literature provides evidence that firms use discretion available in the tax 
accounts to manage earnings upward in an attempt to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts but does 
not provide consistent evidence that firms use the tax accounts to accomplish other earnings 
goals (see Graham et al. 2012 for a review). Some studies examine specific tax-related accounts, 
including valuation allowance, permanently reinvested earnings, or uncertain tax positions.9 
These studies provide insight into possible mechanism(s) through which firms can use tax 
expense to manage earnings, and it is clear that managers have more than one way of exercising 
discretion to affect tax accruals. Other studies take a more general approach and examine 
systematic changes in ETRs from quarter to quarter as evidence of tax expense manipulation 
(e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Cook et al. 2008; Comprix et al. 2012; Christensen et al. 2015; 
Gleason et al. 2017). These studies exploit the interim reporting requirement under APB 28 that 
firms estimate their annual ETR at interim reporting periods, providing a point estimate of 
 
8 We don’t investigate specific sources or explanations for dispersed analyst forecasts. Instead, in this paper we take 
the differences in forecasts as a signal of private information and differing expectations in order to investigate how 
this dispersion affects the behavior of managers at year-end. 
9 For example, Miller and Skinner (1998), Bauman et al. (2001), Schrand and Wong (2003), and Frank and Rego 
(2006) examine valuation allowance, Krull (2004) and Graham et al. (2010) examine permanently reinvested 
earnings, and Cazier et al. (2015) and Gupta et al. (2016) examine uncertain tax positions.  
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managers’ expected annual ETR. They therefore interpret systematic decreases in ETR from 3rd 
to 4th quarter as evidence of earnings-increasing tax expense manipulation.  Because we are 
interested in the association between analysts’ forecast dispersion and firms’ tendency to use tax 
expense late in the year, we exploit this setting to examine ETR changes for firms with 
incentives to decrease ETR to meet analysts’ expectations, or to increase ETR to create cookie 
jar reserves. 
2.2.  Hypothesis development 
We examine the association between analyst forecast dispersion and tax expense 
manipulation to 1) decrease earnings to create cookie jar reserves when pre-managed earnings 
are above the consensus and 2) increase earnings to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts when pre-
managed earnings are below the consensus. Although the theory that guides our hypotheses is 
related for each type of earnings management, we make distinct predictions for each.  
2.2.1.  Earnings management to create reserves 
To illustrate the decision to create cookie jar reserves, consider the hypothetical situations 
outlined for firm A and firm B in Figure 1. At the end of the year, the mean consensus forecast 
from five analyst forecasts is $1.00 per share. However, firms A and B have pre-managed 
earnings that exceed the consensus, with pre-managed EPS of $1.03 per share. Thus, both firms 
could reduce earnings to potentially create income reserves to save for future periods. All five 
analysts following firm A estimate earnings of $1.00 per share (likely based on common 
information), providing a precise target. However, for firm B, analysts’ earnings forecasts 
incorporate private information resulting in a range from four cents above the consensus to four 
cents below it. In fact, although firm B’s pre-managed EPS exceeds the consensus, it does not 
meet analyst E’s forecast. 
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[Insert Figure 1 here] 
We expect that the market’s perception of the relative presence of private information is 
likely to reduce firm B’s decision to create cookie jar reserves relative to that of firm A. 
Although firm B and A’s earnings exceed the consensus forecast by three cents, firm B is less 
able to discount the likelihood that the market could perceive some analysts possessed private 
information. Given that the market responds positively to meeting a larger percentage of 
forecasts (Kirk et al. 2014), firm B is disincentivized to create cookie jar reserves to ensure it 
meets expectations. In fact, managers in firm B’s situation face an incentive to increase earnings 
to account for the potential of private information. Further, managers of firm A are able to 
precisely identify expected earnings and decrease earnings without running the risk of falling 
below expectations and face negative outcomes such as loss of bonuses or jobs (Matsumoto 
2002; Matsunaga and Park 2001; Mergenthaler, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan 2011). These 
arguments suggest that analyst forecast dispersion is associated with less cookie jar behavior. 
Thus, we state our first hypothesis in alternative form, as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Analyst forecast dispersion is negatively associated with firms’ use of tax 
expense to create cookie jar reserves. 
2.2.2.  Earnings management to meet or beat 
To illustrate the decision to manage earnings facing managers with varying levels of 
dispersion, consider the hypothetical situations outlined for firm C and firm D in Figure 1. At the 
end of the year, the mean consensus forecast from five analyst forecasts for firms C and D is 
$1.00 earnings per share (EPS) and each firm has pre-managed EPS (i.e., before tax expense 
manipulation) of $0.97 per share. All five analysts following firm C estimate expected earnings 
of $1.00 per share, so the target is precise. In contrast, analysts’ earnings forecasts vary for firm 
D and range from four cents above the consensus to four cents below it. In this case, the forecasts 
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in the consensus vary and the target is more disperse (i.e., less precise) even though the 
consensus is identical to that for firm C. As discussed above, both firms in this scenario have 
incentives to decrease tax expense in order to increase earnings in an attempt to meet or beat 
earnings expectations, and prior research provides consistent evidence that firms in this scenario 
do engage in this type of earnings management on average. 
The perception of private information regarding earnings expectations could influence 
firm D’s earnings management decision relative to that of firm C. Kirk et al. (2014) find that the 
market does not just react to meeting or beating the consensus, but also the percentage of 
forecasts met. Hence, even if managers in firm C’s situation attempt to increase earnings by three 
or four cents to meet/beat the consensus, managers in firm D’s situation have an incentive to 
increase earnings beyond the consensus to meet a higher percentage of forecasts. For example, in 
this situation firm D would require an increase of seven cents to meet analyst E’s expectations. 
Following Kirk et al (2014), we would expect a positive association between meet or beat 
behavior and analyst forecast dispersion because managers perceive that there is greater reward 
to substantially beat the consensus. That is, firm D will manage earnings to a greater extent than 
firm C and has an incentive to overshoot the consensus. Hence, we state our second hypothesis in 
alternative form, as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Analyst forecast dispersion is positively associated with firms’ use of tax 
expense to meet or beat the consensus forecast.  
3.  Research design 
We use the change in ETR from the third to fourth quarter to examine earnings 
management activity, following the research design in Dhaliwal et al. (2004). Specifically, we 
estimate the following regression as a baseline for our analysis: 
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The dependent variable is the change in ETR from the 3rd fiscal quarter to the 4th fiscal 
quarter. We measure private information using analyst dispersion, DISP, which is equal to the 
standard deviation of the outstanding analyst EPS forecasts issued in the fourth quarter scaled by 
the mean estimate. We retain forecasts from the last quarter of the fiscal year to remove any stale 
earnings forecasts. MISS_AMOUNT is measured as the year-end earnings consensus estimate 
less the firm’s earnings using its 3rd quarter ETR, and it captures the amount the firm would have 
missed the consensus analyst earnings forecast using the firm’s 3rd quarter ETR. Consistent with 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004), we expect a negative coefficient on MISS_AMOUNT, indicating that 
firms decrease their ETR from 3rd to 4th quarter to a greater extent when they would have missed 
the consensus forecast using the 3rd quarter ETR. To test whether the association between 
MISS_AMOUNT and ETR4_ETR3 varies by the level of dispersion, we interact DISP with 
MISS_AMOUNT.  
Control variables follow Dhaliwal et al. (2004) and include INDUCED_ΔETR to control 
for changes in ETR caused by unexpected earnings, TAX_OWED to control for tax owed due to 
mis-estimation of tax liability in prior quarters, ETR3 to control for underlying mean reversion of 
ETRs, and ACCRUALS to control for earnings management using accruals. In addition, we 
supplement the model by including CONSENSUS_CHG to control for a change in the annual 
consensus forecast from the third quarter to year end, LNANALYSTS to control for the number of 
analysts following the firm, SPREAD and EARN_VOL to control for market uncertainty, 
FOREIGN to identify firms with foreign income, ANALYST_CHANGE to control for differences 
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in the number of analysts that issue forecasts in the third quarter compared to only at year-end, 
LNAT to control for firm size, and LAG_ETR4_ETR3 to control for the persistence of 3rd to 4th 
quarter ETR changes year to year. We also include Q4_GUIDANCE, a binary variable equal to 
one if management issues annual or fourth quarter earnings guidance during the fourth quarter, 
and zero otherwise. This variable addresses the possibility that the level of earnings management 
through the tax account could be affected by issuing earnings guidance in the last quarter of the 
year. Finally, we include year and industry fixed effects. All variable definitions are included in 
Appendix A. 
We note that the level of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts can occur for a variety of 
reasons, including general market uncertainty, and these reasons could also be associated with 
volatility in ETR changes. However, we do not expect this issue to inhibit our ability to draw 
inferences from our analysis because we are interested in signed changes in ETR from 3rd to 4th 
quarter (i.e., systematic increases or decreases) which are consistent with cookie jar or earnings 
management behavior and it is unlikely that general uncertainty would introduce bias to our 
analysis that causes directional changes in ETR.10 We also include several controls for market 
uncertainty to further mitigate this concern.  
To examine whether changes in analyst private information will affect manager’s 
earnings management activity, we modify Equation (1a) as follows: !"#4_!"#3'( = 	+, + +.∆/012'( + +34011_54678"'( + +9∆/012 ×4011_54678"'( + +N<68"#6F1'( + J0B!/_!JJ!<"1 + L'( (1b) 
We measure DDISP as the difference in the dispersion of annual earnings forecasts at the 
 
10 In section 5.3 we test this assertion by interacting our proxies for general market uncertainty (bid-ask spread and 
earnings volatility) with MISS_AMOUNT. We find that the coefficients on these interactions are insignificant while 
the interaction with forecast dispersion is consistent with our main analyses, providing support that our main results 
are not driven by market uncertainty driving both analyst forecast dispersion and signed ETR changes.   
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end of the fiscal year and at the end of the third quarter. This variable captures the change in 
heterogeneity (and private information) among analysts during the last quarter of the fiscal year. 
The control variables are consistent with Equation (1a), and all variable definitions are included 
in Appendix A. 
Importantly, because we have separate predictions for firms with pre-managed earnings 
that are above and below the consensus forecast (i.e., H1 and H2, respectively), we examine 
these groups of firms separately. Specifically, we examine firms with pre-managed earnings in 
excess of the consensus forecast using 3rd quarter ETR (i.e., MISS=0) and potentially have the 
ability to create a cookie jar reserve to test H1. We refer to firms in this subsample of firms as 
BEAT firms. For this analysis, we replace MISS_AMOUNT in Equations (1a) and (1b) with 
BEAT_AMOUNT, the amount by which the firm would have met or beat the consensus estimate 
using the third quarter ETR, as follows: !"#4_!"#3'( = 	+, + +./012'( + +3O!5"_54678"'( + +9/012 ×	O!5"_54678"'( + +N<68"#6F1'( + J0B!/_!JJ!<"1 + L'( (2a) !"#4_!"#3'( = 	+, + +.@/012'( + +3O!5"_54678"'( + +9@/012 ×O!5"_54678"'( + +N<68"#6F1'( + J0B!/_!JJ!<"1 + L'( (2b) 
A positive coefficient on BEAT_AMOUNT suggests that, when DISP is zero, firms 
increase their ETR in the 4th quarter as the amount by which pre-managed earnings beats the 
consensus forecast increases, consistent with cookie jar behavior. H1 predicts a negative 
coefficient on β3, consistent with reduced cookie jar behavior as forecast dispersion increases (or, 
inversely, more cookie jar behavior as forecast dispersion decreases).  
To test H2, we estimate Equations (1a) and (1b) for firms with pre-managed earnings less 
than the consensus forecast using 3rd quarter ETR (i.e., MISS = 1). We refer to firms in this 
subsample as MISS firms. H2 predicts the sign of β3 will be negative, suggesting firms are more 
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likely to decrease their ETR to meet or beat the consensus forecast as analyst private information  
increases.  
4.  Empirical results 
4.1.  Sample 
The sample includes firm-year observations at the intersection of IBES and Compustat 
databases for the period 2000 to 2016. We obtain analysts’ annual earnings forecasts from 
I/B/E/S and annual and quarterly financial statement data from Compustat. Management 
guidance data are obtained from Thomson Reuters. Consistent with prior research, we remove 
observations with negative pretax income or negative ETRs. We restrict our sample to 
observations where pre-managed earnings (earnings per share using on third quarter ETR) is 
within ten cents of the ending annual consensus forecasts. These restrictions are to ensure the 
observations in the sample are those likely to manage earnings and are reasonably close to the 
target so earnings management through tax expense is feasible. We require firms be followed by 
at least 3 analysts who issue annual earnings forecasts to meaningfully calculate earnings 
forecast dispersion. Finally, we require all regression variables for our analysis. We winsorize 
continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles and omit influential observations with absolute 
values of studentized residuals greater than two to mitigate the effect of influential observations 
(Leone et al., 2017). The final sample for our main analysis includes 9,056 observations.11 Table 
1 provides a summary of our sample selection procedure.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4.2.  Descriptive and univariate analyses 
Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the full sample. Consistent with prior 
 
11 Note that the number of influential observations varies by model specification, which results in variation in the 
number of observations included in the estimation.  
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research, the negative mean and median values for ETR4_ETR3 suggests that firms, on average, 
decrease their ETR from 3rd to 4th quarter in our sample. The mean (median) value for DISP is 
0.058 (0.021), suggesting the average standard deviation in forecasts is approximately 5.8 
percent of the mean consensus value. The mean (median) DDISP is -0.014 (-0.007), which 
supports the notion that dispersion generally decreases as forecast horizon decreases. This is also 
consistent with increased public information about a firm’s earnings as the fiscal year closes.  
We partition our sample based on positive and negative earnings surprise that would have 
occurred using 3rd quarter ETR (MISS), and we provide mean variable values in Table 2, Panel 
B. ETR4_ETR3 is negative for firms that would have missed the consensus using 3rd quarter ETR 
(MISS = 1) and for firms that would have met or beat the consensus (MISS = 0), and the test of 
difference in the mean value suggests firms that would have missed expectations decrease ETR 
to a greater extent. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 provides correlations between the variables used in our analysis for the full 
sample. Consistent with prior research, we find a negative and significant correlation between 
ETR4_ETR3 and MISS_AMOUNT. The correlations between ETR4_ETR3 and both DISP and 
ΔDISP are positive, suggesting that firms increase ETR as dispersion increases (or, conversely, 
decrease ETR as the earnings target precision increases).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4, Panel A presents univariate evidence regarding differences in earnings 
management using tax expense for firms with high and low dispersion late in the year, where 
firms with high (low) dispersion are those above (below) the sample median value of DISP. The 
results indicate that firms with low forecast dispersion decrease their ETR from 3rd to 4th quarter 
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significantly more than firms covered by analysts with greater private information (p-value < 
0.01). In addition, firms that experience a greater decrease in dispersion late in the year (i.e., 
earnings targets become more precise) decrease their ETR from 3rd to 4th quarter significantly 
more than other firms (p-value < 0.05).  
Panel B of Table 4 provides additional univariate analyses of whether the dispersion of 
the target plays a role in attempted cookie jar or meet/beat behavior. Specifically, we identify 
firms with high and low dispersion, and we split our observations further based on the 
dichotomous variable MISS. For each group of observations, we determine and compare the 
proportion of observations with high and low dispersion in their forecast estimates that achieved 
a specified earnings result (e.g., increased ETR, meet or beat the consensus by one cent, or beat 
the consensus by three or more cents).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
There are several important takeaways from Panel B of Table 4 regarding firms that 
would have missed the consensus forecast using 3rd quarter ETR (MISS=1). First, a higher 
proportion of firms with high forecast dispersion increased ETR in the fourth quarter relative to 
firms with low dispersion (42.2 percent versus 34.1 percent, p-value < 0.01). This result is 
consistent with firms with uncertain earnings targets capitulating on meeting the target, and 
instead, managing year-end ETRs upward (and earnings downward), potentially to create income 
reserves for future periods. Second, low forecast dispersion allows firms to more precisely meet 
or beat earnings benchmarks. A higher proportion of firms with low forecast dispersion 
ultimately met or beat earnings expectation by one cent relative to firms with high forecast 
dispersion (30.0 percent versus 18.5 percent, p-value < 0.01). Third, a higher proportion of firms 
with high forecast dispersion beat expectations by three or more cents relative to firms with low 
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forecast dispersion (23.8 percent versus 21.0 percent, p-value < 0.05). This result suggests that 
some firms with uncertain targets exceed the target by a few cents, potentially in an effort to 
ensure earnings meet expectations. Overall, the univariate tests in Table 4 Panel B suggest that 
firms with precise (certain) earnings targets are better able to meet their targets without an 
excessive reduction in ETRs.  
We also present the proportions tests using firms who would have met or beat the year-
end earnings consensus using 3rd quarter ETR in Table 4, Panel B. We find firms with more 
precise earnings targets are more likely to ultimately meet or beat the consensus forecast by 1 
cent than firms with less precise targets (37.5 percent versus 25.8 percent, p-value < 0.01). 
Further, a higher proportion of firms with low forecast dispersion increase their ETR and meet or 
beat earnings expectations by one cent than other firms (16.4 percent versus 11.0 percent, p-
value < 0.01). This latter result suggests that precision in the earnings target allows managers to 
precisely manipulate ETR without risking the negative consequences of missing market 
expectations. Finally, high forecast dispersion firms are more likely to beat earnings expectations 
by at least three cents than other firms, suggesting that firms with high forecast dispersion are 
more likely to overshoot the target. Combined, these univariate results suggest that managers 
effectively use tax account manipulation to meet or narrowly beat earnings expectations when 
the earnings target is precise. We next turn to multivariate analyses to control for additional 
factors that can affect changes in ETR from 3rd to 4th quarter. 
4.3.  Baseline multivariate results – full sample 
Table 5 Columns (1) and (2) present the results of estimating Equation (1a) and (1b) for 
the full sample. The coefficient on MISS_AMOUNT is negative and significant in both Columns 
(p-values < 0.01 and 0.05, respectively), consistent with prior research and the expectation that 
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firms decrease ETR to manage earnings upward to meet the forecast consensus. In Column (1) 
we find that the coefficient on DISP is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01). This result 
suggests that, on average, firms with more precise or certain earnings benchmarks decrease their 
ETRs from 3rd to 4th quarter to a greater extent than firms with more disperse earnings 
benchmarks. The coefficient estimate for the interaction between DISP and MISS_AMOUNT is 
positive and significant (p-value < 0.01) suggesting that, conditional on MISS_AMOUNT, firms 
reduce their ETR to a greater extent for lower levels of dispersion after controlling for the main 
effect of both DISP and MISS_AMOUNT. Column (2) presents the results when including 
changes in dispersion from the end of the 3rd quarter to year-end (ΔDISP). The coefficient on the 
interaction between DDISP and MISS_AMOUNT is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01), 
suggesting that the association between the change in forecast dispersion and ETR change is 
positively associated with MISS_AMOUNT. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results in Table 5 Columns (1) and (2) provide a baseline for our analyses, but it is 
important to note that these results are based on the full sample, which includes both MISS and 
BEAT firms. Based on the discussion in the previous section regarding the differing incentives 
when firms’ pre-managed earnings are on either side of the earnings target, it is important to 
examine whether the results vary based on which side of the target the firm lands based on pre-
managed earnings. Therefore, in the next section we contrast the regression results for the MISS 
and BEAT firms. 
4.4. Comparing MISS and BEAT firms 
Table 5 Columns (3) and (4) provide the results of estimating Equation (2a) and (2b) for 
the BEAT firms. Likewise, Columns (5) and (6) provides the results for estimating Equation (1a) 
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and (1b) the MISS firms. We begin by analyzing the BEAT firms. In Columns (3) and (4), the 
coefficient estimates for BEAT_AMOUNT are positive and significant (p-values < 0.01 and 0.10, 
respectively) indicating that as firms increase their fourth quarter ETR as they exceed the target 
to a greater extent. Likewise, the positive coefficient estimates for DISP and DDISP for BEAT 
firms in Columns (3) and (4) are positive and significant (p-values < 0.01 and 0.05, respectively) 
indicating that 4th quarter ETRs are also increasing with the dispersion (changes in dispersion) of 
analyst forecasts. Both of these results are consistent with cookie jar behavior. Regarding the 
interaction between DISP (or DDISP) and BEAT_AMOUNT, we expect that precise (less 
disperse) analyst forecasts will provide BEAT firms with a greater incentive to increase ETR to 
create cookie jar reserves. The estimated coefficients for the interactions (DISP * 
BEAT_AMOUNT and DDISP * BEAT_AMOUNT) are both negative and significant (p-values < 
0.01). Overall, these results are consistent with the directional prediction of H1 indicating that 
analyst forecast dispersion is negatively associated with using tax expense to create cookie jar 
reserves. 
In Columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 we present the regression estimates for MISS firms. 
We expect that, on average, MISS firms will reduce 4th quarter ETRs to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts. However, the coefficient estimates on MISS_AMOUNT are statistically insignificant. 
In addition, the coefficient estimate for DISP is positive and significant (p-value<0.05), but the 
coefficient on DDISP is not statistically significant. Finally, the estimated coefficients for the 
interactions (DISP * MISS_AMOUNT and DDISP * MISS_AMOUNT) are both positive, but only 
the interaction with DDISP is statistically significant (p-value<0.10). Hence, it appears that the 
effect of dispersion is primarily concentrated in the BEAT firms (i.e., those firms that have the 
incentive to create cookie jar reserves).  
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To test whether the association is stronger for MISS firms compared to BEAT firms, we 
test the coefficient estimate on the interaction term across equations. We find that the absolute 
value of the coefficient on the interaction between DISP and BEAT_AMOUNT in Column (3) is 
significantly greater than the coefficient on the interaction between DISP and MISS_AMOUNT in 
Column (5) (p-value < 0.05). Similarly, we find that the absolute value of the coefficient on the 
interaction between ΔDISP and BEAT_AMOUNT is significantly greater than the coefficient on 
the interaction between ΔDISP and MISS_AMOUNT (p-value < 0.10). Thus, this evidence 
suggests the association between analyst forecast dispersion and cookie jar behavior is stronger 
than the association between analyst forecast dispersion and meet or beat behavior. That is, 
analyst forecast dispersion is more likely to result in cookie jar behavior than meet or beat 
behavior, consistent with the differing incentives when pre-managed earnings are on either side 
of the consensus forecast.  
Figure 2 provides conditional slope plots as a visual representation of the results in Table 
5.12 In Panel A, the conditional slope on BEAT_AMOUNT for BEAT firms is positive for low 
levels of analyst forecast dispersion, as represented by the positive values of the slope when 
DISP is low. This means that firms increase their ETRs from the 3rd to 4th quarter when they are 
above the target and analyst forecast dispersion is low. However, as dispersion increases the 
conditional slope on BEAT_AMOUNT also decreases. This result indicates that firms are less 
likely to create cookie jars as dispersion increases, consistent with H1. The 95% confidence 
bands indicate that the conditional slope on BEAT_AMOUNT is positive and significant when 
DISP is low, providing evidence of cookie jar activity when the earnings target is precise.  
The conditional slope plot also shows that the association between BEAT_AMOUNT and 
 
12 Burks et al. (2018) provide guidance on the use of conditional slope plots to facilitate interpretation of interactions 
in accounting research. 
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ETR4_ETR3 is negative and significant for high levels of forecast dispersion. This result 
provides additional insight into the association between forecast dispersion and earnings 
management, and firms significantly decrease their ETRs (and increase earnings) when 
dispersion is high even when pre-managed earnings are above the consensus target. This 
evidence is consistent with the incentive to increase earnings to meet or beat a higher percentage 
of forecasts because, even though pre-managed earnings are above the consensus target, firms 
still decrease their ETR to meet the expectations of other analysts (i.e., the analyst forecasts that 
are above the consensus). As shown in Panel B, among MISS firms, the conditional slope on 
MISS_AMOUNT does not vary with DISP.  
The results presented in Table 5 and Figure 2 provide an important insight regarding 
earnings management behavior. Prior studies have interpreted results, such as those in Table 5 
Columns (1) and (2), as evidence of income-increasing earnings management and an absence of 
income decreasing earnings management (i.e., creating cookie jar reserves). However, this 
interpretation uses BEAT firms as a reference category when examining meet or beat activity and 
implicitly assumes BEAT firms do not increase ETR to create cookie jar reserves. The results in 
Columns (3) through (6) suggest that the tax expense manipulation effect is driven by firms that 
would have beat expectations because they increase ETR from 3rd to 4th quarter, potentially in an 
attempt to create reserves for future periods. Because firms with pre-managed earnings that beat 
the consensus have incentives to increase ETR from 3rd to 4th quarter, the relative decrease in 
ETR from 3rd to 4th quarter for firms that would miss could be overstated. Further, the results in 
Table 5 are consistent with our hypotheses and suggest that dispersion is associated with a 
significant reduction in cookie jar behavior, but no significant association with meet or beat 
behavior.  
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5. Supplemental tests 
5.1. Nonlinear effect of dispersion 
In section 2.2 we discussed our prediction regarding how analyst forecast dispersion 
would likely reduce cookie jar behavior and described the tension around how analyst forecast 
dispersion could induce more or less income-increasing behavior. An important consideration for 
each of these predictions is how much ETR manipulation is needed to accomplish the managers’ 
earnings goals (i.e., how far pre-managed earnings are from the target). For example, on the 
cookie jar side, we expect that dispersion will have a stronger deterrent effect when pre-managed 
earnings are close to the benchmark (i.e., BEAT_AMOUNT is smaller) because firms are less 
able to create reserves without disappointing some analysts. Likewise, when pre-managed 
earnings are significantly above the benchmark, dispersion likely does not deter cookie jar 
activity to the same extent because these firms are better able to reduce earnings without the risk 
of disappointing analysts. In contrast, we expect that dispersion will likely increase meet or beat 
behavior when pre-managed earnings are close to the target (i.e., MISS_AMOUNT is smaller) 
because firms have an incentive to meet a larger percentage of forecasts. Moreover, it is likely 
less costly to increase earnings when the firm is closer to the forecasts than when it is further 
away from the forecasts and they need to manage ETRs to a greater extent.  
Based on this discussion, we examine whether analyst forecast dispersion has a different 
effect on meet or beat activity (cookie jar activity) conditional on the magnitude of 
MISS_AMOUNT (BEAT_AMOUNT). That is, we test for a nonlinear effect of dispersion by 
interacting DISP with MISS_AMOUNT and BEAT_AMOUNT cubed.13 Table 6 presents the 
results of this analysis. In Column (1) of Table 6, for BEAT firms, we find that the coefficient on 
 
13 We use a cubed term rather than a squared term in order to preserve the direction of the interaction (income 
increasing or decreasing). 
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interaction between DISP and BEAT_AMOUNT is negative and significant (p-value < 0.05), 
consistent with our primary analyses. However, we find that the coefficient on the interaction 
between DISP and BEAT_AMOUNT^3 is positive and significant (p-value < 0.10) providing 
support for our contention that dispersion will discourage cookie jar behavior to a lesser extent as 
BEAT_AMOUNT is larger.  
In Column (2), for MISS firms, we find that the coefficient on DISP and MISS_AMOUNT 
is negative and significant (p-value < 0.01). This result suggests that dispersion is associated 
with an increase meet or beat activity through reducing ETR from 3rd to 4th quarter, consistent 
with the incentive to meet a greater number of forecasts. However, we find that the coefficient on 
DISP and MISS_AMOUNT^3 is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01), consistent with the 
notion that as firms are further from the forecasts (i.e., MISS_AMOUNT is larger), firms are less 
likely to manage earnings in an attempt to meet or beat the targets. To provide some intuition 
around this result, we take the partial derivative with respect to DISP and find that the 
association between ETR changes and dispersion is negative until MISS_AMOUNT is 
approximately 0.052, at which point the association is positive (and potentially suggests “big 
bath” behavior).  This estimation suggests that dispersion is associated with increased earnings 
management to meet or beat until MISS_AMOUNT is greater than five cents. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Overall, the results in Table 6 provide support for the notion that dispersion has differing 
associations with earnings management activity, contingent on the distance between pre-
managed earnings and the consensus forecast. Further, Table 6 provides additional insight into 
the insignificant primary results for MISS firms: dispersion is associated with earnings-increasing 
(i.e., meet or beat) earnings management behavior when pre-managed earnings is near the 
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consensus, but earnings-decreasing (i.e., big bath) earnings management behavior when further 
from the consensus.  
5.2.  Management guidance 
In our previous regressions, we include a binary variable representing whether 
management issues earnings guidance during the fourth quarter of the fiscal year. Earnings 
guidance represents a potential confound because management issued guidance is a valuable 
voluntary disclosure that analysts use to develop their forecasts. Regulators and investors are 
often concerned that earnings guidance can drive short-termism and motivate managers to 
engage in myopic behavior around their self-imposed earnings targets (Levitt 2000; Hirst et al. 
2008; Huston et al. 2010; Almedia 2018). Indeed, Kasznik (1999) finds that firms manage 
earnings upward to meet their own earnings forecasts, and Aboody and Kasnik (2000) provide 
evidence that CEOs manage investor expectations around stock option award dates.  
Additionally, Cheng et al. (2005) find that firms consistently issuing earnings guidance invest in 
significantly less R&D than firms that do not consistently issue guidance, and that firms that 
consistently provide guidance meet or beat analysts’ forecasts more frequently. Taken together, 
prior research suggests that firms that issue guidance are more likely to engage in earnings 
management activity. In the context of our study, we expect our results to be strongest among 
firms that issue earnings guidance because they are likely more concerned about managing 
earnings around expectations.  
To more fully investigate the effects of earnings guidance, we divide our sample into 
subsamples of firms that issue earnings guidance in the 4th quarter and firms that do not issue 
guidance at all. We then estimate our regressions separately for each of these subsamples. The 
results of these regressions are presented in Table 7 where Panel A presents the results for the 
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firm-years with guidance in the 4th quarter and Panel B presents the results for the firm-years 
with no guidance. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Table 7 indicates that dispersion is primarily associated with ETR adjustment for the 
subsample of firms that issue guidance. Specifically, the interaction between DISP and 
BEAT_AMOUNT for meet firms is only significant for firms that provide guidance in the 4th 
quarter. Consistent with our main analyses, the interaction between DISP and MISS_AMOUNT is 
not significant for firms that provide guidance or those that do not. The pattern of results in Table 
7 are consistent with the notion that firms issuing earnings guidance appear more interested in 
creating cookie jar reserves.  
5.3 General market uncertainty 
It is possible that analyst forecast dispersion is associated with general market 
uncertainty, and market uncertainty could also be correlated with volatility in ETR changes. 
Although we do not expect general market uncertainty to be associated with signed ETR 
changes, our results could be affected to the extent that general uncertainty biases ETR changes 
in a particular direction. To mitigate the concern that our results are a byproduct of the 
associations with general market uncertainty and our variables of interest (ETR changes and 
analyst forecast dispersion), we amend Equation (1a) by including an interaction between 
MISS_AMOUNT and two proxies for general uncertainty, bid-ask spread (SPREAD) and earnings 
volatility (EARN_VOL). In both regressions (untabulated), we find that the coefficients on the 
interactions between MISS_AMOUNT and SPREAD as well as MISS_AMOUNT and EARN_VOL 
are not significantly different from zero (p-values > 0.10), while the coefficient on the interaction 
between MISS_AMOUNT and DISP is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01), consistent with 
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our primary analyses. These results are not consistent with the alternative explanation that 
general market uncertainty driving both analyst forecast dispersion and ETR changes.  
6.  Conclusion 
This study investigates whether the extent of earnings management depends on the 
manager’s perception of private information in analyst forecasts within the consensus estimate. 
Specifically, we examine the extent to which dispersion in analysts’ forecasts affects firms’ 
attempts to manage earnings to 1) decrease earnings and create cookie jar reserves or 2) increase 
earnings to meet or beat the consensus forecast.  
Following the design in prior research (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2004), we use effective tax 
rate changes from the 3rd to 4th quarter to examine whether systematic decreases (increases) in 
ETR are indicative of earnings management (to meet or beat the target or create cookie jar 
reserves) behavior. It is important to our research question to examine the association between 
analyst forecasts dispersion and both earnings management to meet or beat the target, as well as 
cookie jar behavior. Thus, we examine how firms change their ETR on when their pre-managed 
earnings are on each side of the target consensus. That is, we examine firms that would have beat 
the consensus using 3rd quarter ETR (potential cookie jar firms) as well as firms that would have 
missed the analyst consensus forecast using 3rd quarter ETR (potential meet or beat firms).  
Our results indicate that firms engage in cookie jar behavior when analyst forecast 
dispersion is low but do so to a lesser extent as forecast dispersion increases. Specifically, when 
firms’ 3rd quarter ETR would have allowed them meet or beat the consensus analyst forecast, 
they increase their ETR in the 4th quarter, which is indicative of cookie jar behavior. However, 
this cookie jar behavior decreases with the extent of forecast dispersion. In fact, we provide 
evidence that when dispersion is large enough, firms decrease their ETR (and increase earnings) 
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even though their pre-managed earnings are above the consensus forecast. On the other side of 
the target, when firms would have missed the consensus analyst forecast without a change from 
3rd quarter ETR, we do not find a significant association between analyst forecast dispersion and 
ETR decreases. Collectively, this study contributes to the earnings management literature by 
documenting evidence of a previously unexplored but important determinant of earnings 
management activity and provides new insight regarding why and under what circumstances 
firms decide to manage earnings.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions (alphabetical order) 
Variable Definition 
ACCRUALS Total accruals scaled by pre-tax book income, as specified by 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004). 
ANALYST_CHANGE Equal to the change in the number of analysts issuing annual 
earnings forecast in the fourth and third fiscal quarters. 
BEAT_AMOUNT The amount the firm would have beat the consensus analyst earnings 
forecast using the firm’s effective tax rate from the third quarter, 
measured as the consensus analyst forecast minus pretax income 
times 1 minus ETR3 divided by common shares used to calculate 
EPS.  
CLEAN An indicator variable equal to one if the third quarter GAAP ETR is 
within one-half percentage point of the implied I/B/E/S actual 
quarterly ETR (Bratten et al. 2017) 
CONSENSUS_CHG Equal to the difference in the mean annual earnings forecast as of 
the end of the fiscal year and as of the end of the third quarter. 
DISP Standard deviation in analysts’ earnings forecasts at the end of the 
fiscal year, scaled by the mean consensus estimate. We retain only 
forecasts from the last quarter of the fiscal year to remove any stale 
earnings forecasts. 
DDISP  Equal to DISP minus the standard deviation in outstanding analyst 
annual earnings forecasts at the end of the third quarter, scaled by 
the mean consensus estimate at the end of the third quarter. 
EARN_VOL Earnings volatility, measured as the five-year standard deviation of 
earnings before interest and taxes scaled by total assets. 
ETR3 The firm’s ETR in the 3rd quarter, measured as the sum of income 
taxes from the 1st through the 3rd quarter, divided by the sum of 
pretax income from the 1st through the 3rd quarter. 
ETR4_ETR3 Change in the firm’s ETR from 3rd to 4th quarter, measured as the 4th 
quarter ETR minus the 3rd quarter ETR. 
FOREIGN Indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported foreign income in 
the prior year, zero otherwise.  
INDUCED_DETR The change in total tax expense due to the difference between actual 
earnings per share and the consensus forecast divided by pretax 
income. Calculated as the statutory tax rate (0.35 for our sample) 
minus ETR3 times the difference between actual earnings per share 
and the consensus analyst forecast times common shares used to 
calculated EPS divided by 1 minus the statutory tax rate (0.35) all 
divided by pretax income. 
LAG_ETR4_ETR3 Equal to the firm’s ETR4_ETR3 in the prior year 
LNANALYSTS Natural log of the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts. 
LNAT Natural log of total assets for the firm. 
MB An indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s actual earnings meet 
or beat the mean earnings forecast consensus. 
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MISS An indicator variable equal to one if MISS_AMOUNT is greater than 
zero, and zero otherwise. 
MISS_AMOUNT The amount the firm would have missed the consensus analyst 
earnings forecast using the firm’s effective tax rate from the third 
quarter, measured as the consensus analyst forecast minus pretax 
income times 1 minus ETR3 divided by common shares used to 
calculate EPS.  
Q4_GUIDANCE Equal to one if firm management issues guidance on annual or 4th 
quarter earnings in the 4th quarter, and zero otherwise. 
SPREAD Bid-ask spread, equal to the bid-ask spread scaled by the stock price 
at the end of the fiscal year. 
TAX_OWED Taxes payable minus tax refund receivable divided by pretax 
income. 
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Pre-Managed Earnings 
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Figure 1 
Illustration of analyst forecast dispersion and earnings management decision.  
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Figure 2 
Conditional slope plots. 
 
Panel A: Conditional slope and confidence bands for regression coefficient estimate on 
BEAT_AMOUNT conditional on DISP  
 
Panel B: Conditional slope and confidence bands for regression coefficient estimate on 
MISS_AMOUNT conditional on DISP  
 
Fig. 2. Graphs show conditional slopes for the association between ETR changes and 
BEAT_AMOUNT (Panel A) and MISS_AMOUNT (Panel B).  The slope is not statistically 
significant from zero where the 95% confidence bands, represented by the red lines, straddle 
positive and negative conditional slope values.  The vertical blue lines indicate the level of DISP 
at which the slope is statistically significant at the 95% level.   
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Table 1 
Sample Selection. 
 Firm-year observations 
Observations from Compustat 2000 - 2016 97,753 
Less:   
   Observations missing I/B/E/S data (15,635) 
   Observations with fewer than three analysts following (26,740) 
   Observations with negative pretax income or tax expense (17,532) 
   Observations with fewer than $10 million in assets (7) 
   Observations missing data for regression variables (6,656) 
   Observations with MISS_AMOUNT +/- $0.10 (21,260) 
   Observations with absolute value of studentized residuals       
greater than two 
(867) 
  
Full Sample 9,056 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics. 
Panel A: Full Sample (n=9,056) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pct. Median 75th Pct. 
ETR4_ETR3 -0.002 0.036 -0.009 -0.001 0.004 
DISP 0.058 0.124 0.010 0.021 0.052 
DDISP -0.014 0.122 -0.025 -0.007 0.003 
MISS 0.408 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MISS_AMOUNT -0.008 0.050 -0.047 -0.012 0.028 
CONSENSUS_CHG -0.010 0.110 -0.047 0.000 0.036 
INDUCED_DETR 0.000 0.058 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
TAX_OWED 0.049 0.138 0.000 0.002 0.073 
ETR3 0.306 0.123 0.270 0.349 0.382 
ACCRUALS -0.714 1.532 -0.903 -0.415 -0.130 
LNANALYSTS 2.204 0.678 1.609 2.197 2.708 
SPREAD 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.003 
EARN_VOL 0.054 0.069 0.017 0.032 0.062 
FOREIGN 0.485 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ANALYST_CHANGE 0.751 1.014 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LNAT 6.921 1.635 5.709 6.745 7.907 
Q4_GUIDANCE 0.598 0.490 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LAG_ETR4_ETR3 -0.028 0.372 -0.012 0.000 0.004 
      
Panel B: Sample Means for the MISS subsample (n=3,695) and BEAT subsample (n=5,361)  
Variable MISS BEAT Difference T-Stat P-Value 
ETR4_ETR3 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 4.048 0.000 
DISP 0.067 0.051 0.016 6.287 0.000 
DDISP -0.012 -0.016 0.004 1.452 0.146 
MISS_AMOUNT 0.042     
BEAT_AMOUNT  0.043    
CONSENSUS_CHG -0.020 -0.004 -0.016 6.724 0.000 
INDUCED_DETR -0.003 0.002 -0.005 3.425 0.001 
TAX_OWED 0.051 0.048 0.003 1.332 0.183 
ETR3 0.307 0.305 0.002 0.620 0.535 
ACCRUALS -0.835 -0.630 -0.205 6.254 0.000 
LNANALYSTS 2.185 2.216 -0.031 2.126 0.034 
SPREAD 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.041 0.967 
EARN_VOL 0.052 0.056 -0.004 2.376 0.018 
FOREIGN 0.507 0.470 0.037 3.414 0.001 
ANALYST_CHANGE 0.707 0.781 -0.074 3.389 0.007 
LNAT 6.944 6.905 0.039 1.114 0.265 
Q4_GUIDANCE 0.587 0.605 -0.018 1.752 0.798 
LAG_ETR4_ETR3 -0.027 -0.028 0.001 0.123 0.902 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the full sample (Panel A), as well as descriptive statistics 
for MISS firms (MISS = 1) and BEAT firms (MISS = 0) in Panel B.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% level. Appendix A provides all variable definitions.   
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Table 3 
Correlations. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) ETR4_ETR3                  
(2) DISP 0.20                 
(3) ΔDISP 0.04 0.31                
(4) MISS_AMOUNT -0.05 0.06 0.01               
(5) CONSENSUS_CHG -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08              
(6) INDUCED_ΔETR 0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.08             
(7) TAX_OWED 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00            
(8) ETR3 -0.15 -0.14 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.01           
(9) ACCRUALS -0.26 -0.38 0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.02          
(10) LNANALYSTS -0.01 -0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05         
(11) SPREAD 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.22        
(12) EARN_VOL 0.02 0.11 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.13 0.03 -0.09 0.05       
(13) FOREIGNINC -0.03 -0.08 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.16 -0.02 0.07 0.14 -0.10 -0.06      
(14) ANALYST_CHG 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.38 -0.05 0.05 0.03     
(15) LNAT 0.00 -0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.59 -0.20 -0.35 0.16 0.18    
(16) Q4_GUIDANCE 0.00 -0.08 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.19 -0.10 -0.05 0.18 0.03 0.04   
(17) LAG_ETR4_ETR3 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00  
This table presents the Pearson Correlations between the variables in the analysis for the full sample (n=9,056). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. Bold values indicate significance at p < 0.05 or better. Appendix A provides variable definitions.  
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Table 4 
Univariate Analyses. 
Panel A: ETR Changes (ETR4_ETR3) by Level of Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
 
Full Sample High Low Difference t-statistic p-value 
DISP -0.001 -0.003 0.002 3.133 0.002 
DDISP -0.002 -0.003 0.001 2.309 0.021 
      
MISS=0 Firms 
DISP -0.003 -0.006 0.002 2.015 0.044 
DDISP -0.002 -0.006 0.004 3.056 0.002 
      
MISS=1 Firms 
DISP 0.000 -0.002 0.002 3.138 0.002 
DDISP -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.298 0.766 
      
Panel B: Proportions Tests 
MISS firms  
Actual Result High Disp Low Disp Difference T-statistic p-value 
Increase ETR 0.422 0.341 0.081 5.251 0.000 
      
Meet/Beat by 
1 cent 0.185 0.300 -0.115 8.814 0.000 
      
Beat - 3+ 
cents 0.238 0.210 0.027 2.118 0.034 
      
BEAT firms  
Actual Result High Disp Low Disp Difference T-statistic p-value 
Increase ETR 0.510 0.580 -0.070 4.834 0.000 
      
Meet/Beat by 
1 cent 0.258 0.375 -0.117 8.713 0.000 
      
Beat - 3+ 
cents 0.365 0.283 0.082 6.099 0.000 
      
Increase ETR 
& Meet/Beat 
by 1 cent 0.110 0.164 -0.054 5.336 0.000 
High (low) dispersion firms are defined as firms above (below) the median value of DISP or DDISP. 
Bolded values indicate the larger value for that row between high dispersion and low dispersion 
observations.  
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Table 5   
ETR Management and Analyst Forecast Dispersion – Full Sample, BEAT Firms, and MISS Firms.    
DV = ETR4_ETR3  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Variable  Full Sample  Full Sample  BEAT firms  BEAT firms MISS firms MISS firms 
DISP  0.032***    0.053***   0.043**  
  (4.542)    (2.973)   (2.080)  
DDISP    0.037*    0.035**  0.023 
    (1.912)    (2.188)  (1.120) 
BEAT_AMOUNT      0.084***  0.028*   
      (4.887)  (1.749)   
DISP * BEAT_AMOUNT      -0.813***     
      (-2.713)     
DDISP * BEAT_AMOUNT        -0.953***   
        (-3.349)   
MISS_AMOUNT  -0.071***  -0.047**     -0.030 0.003 
  (-7.940)  (-2.221)     (-1.103) (0.113) 
DISP * MISS_AMOUNT  0.495***       0.202  
  (3.824)       (0.544)  
DDISP * MISS_AMOUNT    1.071***      0.844* 
    (2.611)      (1.741) 
CONSENSUS_CHG  -0.009**  -0.029***  -0.004  -0.002 -0.016*** -0.015** 
  (-2.478)  (-2.650)  (-0.893)  (-0.576) (-2.645) (-2.318) 
INDUCED_DETR  0.043**  0.095**  0.020  0.028 0.111*** 0.107*** 
  (2.491)  (2.219)  (0.929)  (1.290) (3.939) (3.928) 
TAX_OWED  0.011**  0.045***  0.008  0.011** 0.015* 0.017** 
  (2.564)  (3.117)  (1.611)  (2.254) (1.891) (2.077) 
ETR3  -0.045***  -0.134***  -0.034***  -0.039*** -0.072*** -0.081*** 
  (-10.233)  (-9.501)  (-6.425)  (-6.964) (-8.264) (-9.076) 
ACCRUALS  -0.005***  -0.013***  -0.007***  -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
  (-8.743)  (-9.911)  (-7.489)  (-7.112) (-5.196) (-5.759) 
LNANALYSTS  0.001*  0.003  0.001  0.001 0.003* 0.002 
  (1.690)  (1.284)  (1.350)  (0.792) (1.789) (1.373) 
SPREAD  -0.084  0.062  0.061  0.042 -0.264* -0.268* 
  (-1.082)  (0.277)  (0.807)  (0.580) (-1.769) (-1.784) 
EARN_VOL  -0.003  0.006  -0.004  -0.003 0.010 0.010 
  (-0.490)  (0.300)  (-0.712)  (-0.468) (0.702) (0.659) 
FOREIGN  -0.001*  0.004*  -0.001  -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.675)  (1.786)  (-1.283)  (-1.781) (-0.749) (-0.813) 
ANALYST_CHANGE  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 -0.001* -0.001 
  (-0.488)  (0.319)  (0.287)  (0.448) (-1.718) (-1.264) 
LNAT  -0.000  -0.003***  -0.001*  -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.552)  (-3.781)  (-1.909)  (-2.049) (-1.254) (-1.426) 
Q4_GUIDANCE  0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.002 
  (0.829)  (-0.517)  (0.845)  (1.250) (0.840) (1.033) 
LAG_ETR4_ETR3  0.002  0.006  0.001  0.000 0.005 0.006** 
  (1.132)  (1.553)  (0.683)  (0.202) (1.516) (2.064) 
Constant  0.007  0.044***  -0.001  0.003 0.018 0.016 
  (1.029)  (2.618)  (-0.254)  (0.651) (1.488) (1.082) 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  9,057  9,435  5,338  5,336 3,733 3,746 
R2  0.130  0.181  0.135  0.120 0.145 0.147 
***, **, * Represent significance levels at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed). Coefficients and their 
respective t-statistics are presented. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. We use robust standard errors and remove influential 
observations using studentized residuals greater than the absolute value of 2. 
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Table 6 
Nonlinear effect of dispersion.  
DV = ETR4_ETR3  (1)  (2) 
Variable  BEAT firms  MISS firms 
DISP  0.073***  0.103*** 
  (3.099)  (3.840) 
MISS_AMOUNT    0.114* 
    (1.783) 
BEAT_AMOUNT  0.119***   
  (2.905)   
DISP * MISS_AMOUNT    -3.718*** 
    (-3.839) 
DISP * BEAT_AMOUNT  -1.910**   
  (-2.515)   
MISS_AMOUNT^3    -17.393** 
    (-2.339) 
BEAT_AMOUNT^3  -4.131   
  (-0.927)   
DISP*MISS_AMOUNT^3    466.429*** 
    (4.378) 
DISP*BEAT_AMOUNT^3  136.148*   
  (1.687)   
Constant  -0.002  0.008 
  (-0.441)  (0.522) 
Controls  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes 
Observations  5,337  3,734 
R2  0.137  0.119 
***, **, * Represent significance levels at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed). Coefficients and their respective t-statistics are presented. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. We use robust standard errors and remove influential 
observations using studentized residuals greater than the absolute value of 2. 
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Table 7 
ETR Management – Earnings Guidance.  
Panel A: Firms Providing Guidance 
DV = ETR4_ETR3  (1)  (2) 
Variable  BEAT firms  MISS firms 
DISP  0.095***  -0.041 
  (5.286)  (-1.151) 
MISS_AMOUNT    -0.072 
    (-1.265) 
BEAT_AMOUNT  0.105***   
  (4.595)   
DISP * MISS_AMOUNT    1.060 
    (1.537) 
DISP*BEAT_AMOUNT  -2.024***   
  (-4.319)   
CONSENSUS_CHG  -0.012**  -0.029** 
  (-2.261)  (-2.222) 
INDUCED_DETR  0.108**  0.071* 
  (2.462)  (1.730) 
TAX_OWED  0.002  0.066*** 
  (0.258)  (3.543) 
ETR3  -0.100***  -0.182*** 
  (-4.886)  (-6.495) 
ACCRUALS  -0.008***  -0.005** 
  (-5.531)  (-2.533) 
LNANALYSTS  0.003  0.006 
  (1.111)  (1.216) 
SPREAD  0.073  -0.234 
  (0.477)  (-0.831) 
EARN_VOL  0.011  -0.021 
  (0.585)  (-0.672) 
FOREIGN  -0.001  -0.008 
  (-0.323)  (-1.266) 
ANALYST_CHANGE  0.001  0.001 
  (1.614)  (0.846) 
LNAT  0.002  0.000 
  (0.738)  (0.009) 
LAG_ETR4_ETR3  -0.004  -0.003 
  (-1.463)  (-0.716) 
Constant  -0.006  0.116*** 
  (-0.658)  (0.846) 
Year FE  Yes  Yes 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes 
Observations  3,213  2,182 
R2  0.202  0.201 
(continued) 
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Table 7, continued 
Panel B: Firms Not Providing Guidance 
DV = ETR4_ETR3  (1)  (2) 
Variable  BEAT firms  MISS firms 
DISP  0.018  0.106** 
  (0.671)  (2.001) 
MISS_AMOUNT    0.043 
    (0.537) 
BEAT_AMOUNT  0.005   
  (0.119)   
DISP * MISS_AMOUNT    -0.738 
    (-0.822) 
DISP*BEAT_AMOUNT  0.205   
  (0.435)   
CONSENSUS_CHG  0.005  -0.007 
  (0.535)  (-0.462) 
INDUCED_DETR  -0.006  0.082 
  (-0.157)  (0.994) 
TAX_OWED  -0.001  0.006 
  (-0.085)  (0.222) 
ETR3  -0.118***  -0.218*** 
  (-3.519)  (-4.611) 
ACCRUALS  -0.006***  -0.002 
  (-3.587)  (-1.172) 
LNANALYSTS  0.002  0.014 
  (0.559)  (1.353) 
SPREAD  -0.165  0.077 
  (-0.750)  (0.161) 
EARN_VOL  0.014  0.131* 
  (0.480)  (1.925) 
FOREIGN  -0.003  0.004 
  (-0.477)  (0.342) 
ANALYST_CHANGE  -0.002**  -0.004 
  (-2.264)  (-1.316) 
LNAT  -0.001  0.007 
  (-0.234)  (0.658) 
LAG_ETR4_ETR3  -0.000  0.015** 
  (-0.030)  (2.044) 
Constant  0.026  -0.100 
  (0.932)  (-1.597) 
Year FE  Yes  Yes 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2,121  1,557 
R2  0.181  0.231 
***, **, * Represent significance levels at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). Coefficients and their respective t-statistics are presented. Variable definitions are provided 
in Appendix A. We use robust standard errors and remove influential observations using studentized 
residuals greater than the absolute value of 2. All regressions include year and one-digit SIC industry 
fixed effects. 
 
 
